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ANSWERS TO SYKES' CLAIMS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Hatch takes issue with portions of Sykes' "Statement of the Case."
The 4 claims made by Sykes at the bottom of page 6 are all false and
none of them prevailed in court under the scrutiny of testimony and
evidence.
Contrary to Sykes' statements, the three Sykes were allowed to
fully participate in the trial, including opening and closing statements,
testifying, cross examination, and calling their own witnesses for direct and
redirect examination.

DID THE COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DEFAULTING MR. SYKES IN THIS CASE?
In the default ruling, and for well over a decade, the court has

exercised great patience with Mr. Sykes and has endured abuse after abuse.
Mr. Sykes has repeatedly disregarded court rules and instructions. The
patience of the court was clearly manifest before and during the latest trial.
On January 5, 1994, in a "Final Pre-trial Conference," the court
issued a default judgment against the Sykes' for failure to answer an
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Amended Complaint and for failure to appear at the said conference.
(R 1188). The court ordered the trial to proceed on January 27, 1994 to
determine damages suffered by Mr. Hatch from the tortuous conduct of the
Sykes'.
The court later gave in to pleadings for mercy by Dwane Sykes and
set aside the default and agreed to scheduled a new date for another pretrial hearing and for a new trial. (R 1242). This impertinent and abusive
delay by Sykes resulted in additional and great expense to Hatch.
In the new pre-trial hearing and Scheduling Conference held on
September 2, 1994 (R. 1444), time constraints needed to accommodate a
jury trial in 6 days were considered. The number of witnesses and the time
needed to present the issues were carefully considered. Out of those
deliberations and with mutual agreement came the following Order issued
by the Court:
Approximately 22 people will be expected to appear
as witnesses. Each side will be limited to no more than 6
"character" witnesses, going to the issue of credibility. Each
side will be allowed approximately 17 hours to present his
case. (R. 1443) (Emphasis added).
In violation of this court order, Mr. Sykes submitted a witness list of
74 (68 by name and 6 by title) ( R 1682). Included in the list of 68 were 30

already designated as character witnesses by Mr. Sykes, himself, in his
Exhibit 84, pages 1, 2, & 3. This exhibit (witness list) was referred to by
Sykes at the bottom of the witness list he filed with the court on October 19,
1994 (R 1383). He referred to the list as "all persons on Sykes' 3-page list
filed in the 1980s of Howard Hatch's dissatisfied business associates."
These names were not evidence witnesses but were set up and groomed
by Dwane Sykes to be character assassins of Mr. Hatch in Dwane's efforts
to confuse the issues and befuddle the jury (R 1383 and Exhibit 84). The
character of Mr. Hatch was not an issue in this case, but Mr. Sykes was
desperate and grasping at anything that might tend to mitigate damage
resulting from his own tortuous conduct.
But the witness list, which greatly exceeded the limit set by the court,
was only a part of the many abuses inflicted on the Court and on Mr. Hatch
by Dwane Sykes, resulting in the Default ruling by the court (R 2056-2059).
During the 46 days preceding the trial (December 23, 1994 through
February 6, 1995) Dwane Sykes inundated the Court and Mr. Hatch with
over 50 documents consisting of over 350 pages, almost entirely
irrelevant, redundant, and often spurious. (And that does not include the
exhibits.) The flood of documents consisted of petitions, motions, requests,

letters, certificates, orders to show cause, affidavits, objections, notice of
interest, deeds, etc. The entire case has been similarly abused by Dwane
Sykes over the years, until now the court record fills 3 large cardboard
boxes and weighs in excess of 80 pounds when the companion case CV63,695 is included.
On January 12, 1995, Howard Hatch in his argument in response to
one of Sykes'many motions stated:
Mr. Sykes comes to this court begging for special
consideration with very "dirty hands." He has done all in his
power to subvert the judicial process, and now he expects this
court to violate its own order to accommodate him in his very
late and dilatory request.
It is clear to me that it is a tactic to either put off the trial
or to cause enough confusion as to make it impossible for me
to put in the time necessary to properly prepare, i.e. identify
documents, subpoena witnesses, prepare jury instructions,
organize the presentation, etc. . . . (R. 1577)
The court stated well its reasons for defaulting the Sykes' in its Order
of Default (R. 2056-2059). In addition to the Sykes' complete disregard of
the court's specific order governing the list of witnesses and especially the
"character" witnesses, the court cites other abuses leading to the default
order. Some of those abuses cited are the following (R 2056-2059):
5. ". . . the Court was constantly bombarded by a myriad of disparate
requests, objections and ex parte motions, some mailed, some faxed, but
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none of them strictly meeting the form requirements set down by the rules,
all during a time reserved for trial preparations."
6. " None of the time deadlines layed out in the pretrial order were
properly complied with by the Sykes, either as to the witness list or exhibits
(the final witness list was amended after the January 9 deadline and a
motion made on January 9th for an extension of time in which to 'complete
his compilation of exhibits and witnesses and lists' for trial."
7. "The Plaintiffs, Sykes, have previously been defaulted for nqt
answering the original complaint in the consolidated case CV 63,695, which
was set aside by the good graces of the Court."
8. "They were again defaulted for failing to answer the Second
Amended Complaint (under CV 63,695), filed August 3, 1993, and for not
appearing at the pretrial scheduling conference held January 5, 1994, which
caused the opposing party substantial amounts in attorneys fees due to the
striking of the trial date and the need to contest the objections to the default
being taken."
9. "This court, in an extra effort to deal equitably with the parties, did
allow for the default ordered January 5, 1994, to be set aside by its Orcler
February 23, 1994, allowing the Sykes to prepare and present their defenses
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at a trial to be rescheduled."
10. "However, the Court concluded because of the Sykes's actions
noted above, and their manifest intention of subverting the judicial system,
that they did indeed deserve to be defaulted."
11. "Consequently, this Court, by its Order Regarding Court
Availability dated February 1, 1995, did enter a default against the three
PlaintitT/counterdefendant parties, Dennis L. Sykes, Dwane J. Sykes and
Patricia Sykes."
The Court in its Order further held:
3. "That the Plaintiffs/counterdefendants shall be allowed to appear
at trial to defend against the extent of damages requested or to attempt to
mitigate them by justifying the actions taken by them."
4. "That the defaulting parties' defense being stricken are judged
without merit and their multitude of findings, objections to orders, requests
for extensions, defaults, and other attempts to delay the conclusion of this
matter these 14 years have all been in bad faith." (R 2056-2059).
(Emphasis added.)
The court did indeed have good and sufficient grounds for issuing
a default against the Sykes' in (his case.
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WAS DEFAULT TOO SEVERE?
The Sykes' brief complains of the severity of a default judgment
when less severe sanctions could be imposed. They cite Utah Dept. ojf
Transportation v. Osguthorpe in support of their concern. But the very
case they cite held as follows:
Osguthorpe contends that the district court abused its
discretion in denying the motion to set aside his default and
the resulting judgment of just compensation because a number
of lesser sanctions or remedies could have been imposed by
the court without resorting to the "ultimate" sanction.
However,
before we will interfere with the trial court's exercise of
discretion, abuse of that discretion must be clearly
shown . . . . That some basis may exist to set aside the
default does not require the conclusion that the court
abused its discretion in refusing to do so when facts
and circumstances support the refusal.
Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted); see also Darrington, 812 P.2d at 457 (trial
courts vested with considerable discretion to grant or deny
motions to set aside default judgments.)
The above comes from Utah Department of Transportation v. D.
A. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 8 (Supreme Court of Utah - 1995)
The trial court in its Order Regarding Court Availability issued on
February 1, 1995, which included its Order defaulting Sykes stated:
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Several months ago sanctions were imposed on Mr.
Sykes for his failure to follow case management orders. The
sanctions imposed on that occasion was dismissal of his claims
against Mr. Hatch.
The only remaining sanction appears to be to enter his
default and remove him from the balance of this case.
Consequently, this ORDER ISTHE DEFAULT of Mr.
Sykes. He will not be allowed to appear and defend this action.
(R 1755-1757).
WAS SYKES DENIED DUE PROCESS
Had the above Order stood, denying the Sykes' any participation in
the trial in their efforts to mitigate damages, they might be heard to argue
lack of "due process" or that they were denied their "day in court."
Whether their argument would prevail is another matter. But, here the
Sykes' were not denied their day in court nor were they denied due process.
Dwane Sykes, Dennis Sykes and Patricia Sykes were all three
allowed to appear in the case in an effort to defend against and to mitigate
damages. This was done at the request and encouragement of Hatch and
with permission of the Court.

They were allowed to testify, to cross-

examine witnesses and to call their own witnesses. The trial was conducted
as though the default order had never been issued. Dwane Sykes gave his
opening statement (R. 2727). Dwane Sykes gave his closing statement (R.
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3310). Dwane cross-examined Hatch's witnesses and Dwane called hiib
own witnesses for direct examination (R. 3214 & 3234) and for redirect
examination (R. 3260). And all this, contrary to the claims by Sykes in his
Brief of Appellee/Cross Appellant. (See Sykes Brief, pages 14 & 16).
Since the Sykes' were defaulted months ago on the issues, their only
defense was an attempt to mitigate damages. And this they were given
every opportunity to do. So even if the default order could be ruled an
abuse of discretion, there still would be no grounds for ordering a new trial
because the necessary elements of a second trial were found in this trial.
Mr. Sykes was given "due process." His participation in the trial
went forward as though there had been no default. He had his "day in
court." And even his day in court was abused with his egregious and
intolerable conduct (R 3294).
Howard Hatch requests the Utah Court of Appeals to affirm the trial
court's Order of Default and to affirm the trial court's denial of a new trial.

RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL ON DAMAGES
The Sykes' brief claims that I latch had no right to a jury trial on the
issue of damages once default was entered against Sykes, To support their
position their brief cites Arnica Mutual Insurance Co, v Schettler, 768
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P.2d950. (Utah App. 1989) ("Arnica'1)
In claiming Hatch had no right to a jury trial on damages, Sykes
misreads the Arnica case. A correct reading of the Arnica case when
applied to this case would read: '"Sykes had no right to a jury trial once
default wa^ entered against him." It does not preclude Hatch from the right
to a jury trial when default is entered against Sykes, but leaves Hatch the
option to continue with a jury trial to assess damages or to unilaterally
withdraw his "original demand for a jury trial and request a fact-finding
hearing on the issue of damages pursuant to Rule 55 (b) (2) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure." (page 955 of the Arnica case).
In the Arnica case, Arnica chose to withdraw u its original demand for
a jury trial, and requested a fact-finding hearing on the issue of damages
pursuant to Rule 55 (b) (2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." (Arnica,
page 955). Hatch has the option

S> kes, the defaulted party, does not.

The Arnica case held that the Utah rules,
grant a trial court the discretion to determine whether a jury
trial is appropriate in setting damages. Rule 55 (b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure does not specify a right to a jury trial
as do ihe federal rules but instead, permits a court to conduct
hearings or order such references as the court deems necessary.
Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not err by allowing
Arnica to unilaterally withdraw its request for a jury trial.
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(Arnica Mutual Insurance Company v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950,
963. (Utah Court of Appeals-- 1989)

WAS THE REDUCTION OF DAMAGES JUSTIFIED?
Howard Hatch agreed with the reopening of the case to release
Denies Sykes and Patricia Sykes and to hold Dwane Sykes 100%
responsible for a ll damages as though he were the only party sued. Dwane
was

the culprit, the primary tort-feasor, by his own admission (R. 3310,

331 \, & 3314). It was mutually agreed that all of the damages assessed
against Dennis Sykes and Patricia Sykes would be transferred to Dwane
Sykes (R 2443, pages 7-12).
The damages would then be subject to review by the court to see
if there was sufficient evidence to support the amounts found by the jury in
eacfr of the categories. That review was mutually agreed to by Hatch and
Sykes in post-trial hearings (R 2443, p. 7-12)But Hatch takes strong issue with the reduction of the damage awards
as

outlined in the trial court's "Order Granting Sy\es" Motion To Alter And

Amend Judgment And Altered And Amended Judgment'* and the court's
deleting the award of "reasonable attorney fees after judgment" and the!
court's refusal to grant costs and attorney fees for the case. (R.2347-2355).

u

In the Brief of Appellant submitted to the court on October 30, 1996,
a return to the total and full damage awards granted by the jury is
respectfully argued. Certainly the evidence presented to the jury, in their
judgment, supported the damages awarded by them. And our courts have
consistently held:
An appellate court (or a trial court) owes broad
deference to the finder of fact (the jury) and its power to
review a jury verdict challenged on grounds of insufficient
evidence is limited. In reviewing a challenge to a civil jury
verdict all evidence must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the verdict. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.,
817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991); Von Hake v. Thomas,
705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985).
The reviewing court must assume the jury believed the evidence and
inferences that support the verdict. Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781
P.2d 414, 417 (Utah 1989). Courts should exercise caution and reluctance
in interfering with jury verdict. Schow v. Guardtone, Inc., 417 P.2d 643,
18 Utah 2d 135, (Utah 1966).
WAS HATCH THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST?
This issue raised in the Sykes' brief is and has been for many years
res judicata. I latch was always the o\\ ner of the property until it was lost at
a Sheriffs sale in 1983 brought about by tortuous acts of Dwane Sykes. At
one time Hatch issued a deed to his 100% owned partnership in lieu of a

mortgage (you hold this until I pay you back. It was held in trust to assure
repayment.) Hatch retained ownership and was always the owner. He was
so recognized when the Sheriffs sale was conducted. The court during the
15 years of litigation has always acknowledged and recognized Hatch as the
owner of the property until lost at the Sheriffs sale. Sykes knows this and
yet he keeps trying to "ride a dead horse."

REPLY TO SYKES' ANSWERS TO HATCH'S BRIEF
SIX DAY TRIAL CUT TO THREE DAYS
Sykes makes an issue of Match's reference to time restraints
imposed by cutting the time from 6 days to 3 days in which to present
evidence to support his claims as outlined in his Amended Complaint
(R 1167-1172). The time limitation did not allow Hatch to put on all of his
witnesses to support his claims, and to support other claims he never got to,
including attempted extortion, libel, slander and forgery (R 1169).
Hatch recognizes such evidence cannot be given in post-trial hearings
in hopes of getting the court to include such evidence to support findings for
damages. And yet, that is exactly what Counsel for Sykes is attempting
to do, to have the court modify the findings of the jury. In post-trial
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hearings Counsel for Sykes brought in assertions or claims to urge the court
to reduce or eliminate damages assessed by the jury. Such assertions or
claims that were not presented during the trial, cannot now be raised in an
effort to modify the jury's verdict. Sykes had his opportunity during the
trial to raise any offsets or other evidence that might have caused the jury to
consider those claims during their deliberations. But it is too late now for
both parties. As Hatch and the Court both said in post-trial hearings,
concerning 15 years of litigation, "Enough is enough!" (R 2530 & 2544).
The court is duty bound to look to evidence presented at trial in its
weighing the sufficiency of the evidence and not consider assertions made
after the trial.
Hatch stands by his claim to full damages assessed by the jury in this
case, plus interest as calculated by the court. And that is $376,000.00 in
compensatory and punitive damages as found by the jury, plus $133,942.03
in interest as determined by the court up to the date of the judgment and the
Supplemental Findings of Fact on the 5th day of April 1995, for a total of
$509,942.03 (R 2060-2064). And of course, interest since April 5, 1995
should be added to the total, according to current interest allowed by law,
WATER STOCK CONVERSION

Hatch will stand by his statements in his initial brief (pages 14-16)
with the following reply to the Sykes' brief on the subject. Hatch
subpoenaed Melvin J. Ludlow, Secretary of West Smith Ditch Company
since 1972, to appear in court and testify to the value of the water stock that
was fraudulently obtained by Sykes (R 1803). Mr. Ludlow had sustained a
serious injury to his spine and was not able to attend the trial. However, he
did send an affidavit testifying that each share of water stock was equivalent
to 24.82 acre feet of water (per year) and that it was his opinion that each
acre foot of water was worth $ 1,000. That would make .6 of a share worth
$14,892 (the stock that was fraudulently obtained by Sykes). (Exhibit 80).
With Ludlow not present to testify about present and past value of the
water stock, it would appear the jury accepted Hatch's figure of $1,500 as
the value at the time of conversion and added $4,500 in punitive damages.
(R3343).
TRESPASS DAMAGES
Dwane Sykes in his brief treats his hostile trespass on Hatch's
property as insignificant or "nebulous" with regard to damages.
The Court of Appeals of our sister state, New Mexico, held:
Every unauthorized entry upon land of another is a
trespass which entitles owner to verdict for some damages.
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North v. Public Service Co. of New Mexico, 608 P.2d 1128
(1980)
Our sister state, Oregon has held:
In action for trespass to land . . . law presumes that
plaintiff has been damaged, without necessity of proof of
actual damage. Rhodes v. Harwood, 544 P.2d 147, 273 Or.
903. (1975)
Regarding horses trespassing OH the land of another, our own
erne Court of Utah has held:
Although evidence of amounts expended for restoration
or repairs necessitated by damage to plaintiffs premises
resulting from defendant's horses trespassing would be
pertinent to show amounts of damage, it was not essential
that repairs be made and paid for as condition precedent to
right to recover for damage actually suffered.
Jury assesses damages and its findings will not be
disturbed so long as there is reasonable basis in evidence
to support them.
Under proper circumstances, punitive damages may
be allowed in cases of trespass.
If wrongful act by which one injures another is done
willfully and maliciously, punitive damages may be imposed
as punishment to defendant for such conduct and is warning
to him and others against it.
Whether defendant's conduct in allowing his horses
to trespass upon plaintiffs property was willful and
malicious and whether punitive damages should be assessed
was jury question.
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Defendant advances the argument that because plaintiffs
failed to present evidence of any definite amounts expended
for restoration or repairs necessitated by the damages to their
premises, no award of damages could be made. This position
is not sound. While evidence of amounts so expended would
be pertinent to show such damage, it is not essential that the
repairs be made and paid for as a condition precedent to a
right of recovery for damages actually suffered. . . Defendant's
attack in that regard is answered by the oft-repeated preposition that it is the jury's prerogative as the trier of the facts to
assess the damages; and that because of its advantaged position
in close proximity to the trial, the parties and the witnesses,
its findings thereon will not be disturbed so long as there is
any reasonable basis in the evidence to support them.
The amount that justly and properly may be awarded
as punitive damages is obviously difficult to evaluate in
terms of money. This is also subject to the usual rule: that
it should be left to the sound judgment of the jury.
The above quotations all come from the case decided by the Supreme
Court of Utah in 1963. Powers v. Taylor & Stillnian v. Taylor, 379 P.2d
380, 381, & 382. (1963)
All acts of trespass complained of by Hatch took place during the
time that Hatch owned the land and up to the time it was lost at a Sheriffs
sale on May 4, 1983 (R 3 & 14, Civil No. 63,695, case that was
consolidated with present case). The acts of trespass are listed in Hatch's
Counter Claim filed with the court May 12, 1981. (R 80, 64, 63, 62, 61,
& 60). Acts of trespass by Dwane Sykes are testified to in testimony given
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at the trial (R 2705-2707, 2918-2925, 2928, 2937-2940, 2968, 3162-3163,
3334-3335). Hatch lost the property in May 1983 at a Sheriff sale.
SLANDER OF TITLE
Sykes in his Brief of Appellee/Cross Appellant is attempting to take
an offset against the jury award of $105,000, that was awarded for loss of
the property that resulted from Sykes' fraud and slander of title. But no
such claims for offsets were made during the trial, when Sykes had every
opportunity to attempt to mitigate his damages. These claims to an offset
were brought up in post-trial hearings, not during the trial (R 2567-2569).
If Hatch cannot bring up evidence to support claims that were not covered
during the trial, neither can Sykes. The jury took into consideration all
evidence presented at trial. The jury did not award Hatch damages for libel
or slander because Hatch never got evidence before the jury to support the
claims. As the Brief filed by Mr. Sykes would suggest, "what's good for
the goose is good for the gander." Claims are limited to evidence presented
at the trial. And that's all the jury had to go by. These same claims hold
true with Interference with Advantageous Business Relationship. Sykes did
not attempt to offset this claim in any way. All the jury had to go by was
what was presented to them. And the jury's verdict should be upheld.
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PUNITIVE DAMAGES
On page 23 under Punitive Damages, Sykes Brief states: "Mr.
Hatch argues that $75,000 in punitive damages is reasonable and supported
by the evidence." This is not true. Mr. Hatch argues that $225,000 in
punitive damages is reasonable and supported by the evidence and was
awarded by the jury, and we ask that it be returned by the Court of Appeals.
ATTORNEY FEES
On page 23 of the Sykes Brief on the first line under Attorney's Fees
and Costs, "the North half should read "the South half." And it was under
the contract dealing with the south half that was sold to Sykes where the
water stock was illegally converted by Sykes in violation of the contract.
Sykes under false pretenses took the water stock belonging to both the
south half and the north half and registered it in his name when his contract
called for .6 shares, not 1.2 shares. Hatch claims costs and attorney fees in
this case as provided for in the contract.
Hatch also claims costs and attorney fees under Section 78-27-56 (1)
of the Judicial Code. In this case Sykes prosecuted and defended this case
without merit and in bad faith as determined by the court and so ruled in
its ORDER OF DEFAULT (R 2059, 2056 #4) dated 5 April 1995 and made

19

of record on 14 April 1995. Hatch also claims and requests costs and
attorney fees for collections after judgment as provided for by Rule 4-505
(3) of the Code of Judicial Administration, Utah Code, as requested in the
initial brief. Costs and attorney fees were awarded by the Court to assist in
the collection process and were then later deleted without just cause.
(R 2063-2064 and 2348-2355).
CONCLUSION
Hatch requests the Court of Appeals to affirm the trial court's default
of Sykes and the denial of a new trial. Hatch also requests the court to
restore the full amount of the jury awards in all categories, restoring the
original amount of $509,942.03 plus interest on this amount since the
signing of the Judgment on 5 April 1995. There was no evidence
introduced at trial that should reduce the jury verdict and award. Hatch
also requests costs and attorney fees in this case and costs and attorney fees
in the process of collection all as provided for by law.
At trial Hatch testified: "While we haven't gone over all the figures,
we feel we ought to be entitled to $30,000 in attorney fees and we will
establish that by affidavit and we'll leave that in the hands of the judge to
decide if they are fair and appropriate if we can justify them. In our costs

20

over the 14 year period between 5 and $10,000" (R 3341).
Respectfully submitted this 5th day of February 1997

^JA

Jpencer F. Hatch
Attorney for Appellant, Howard F. Hatch

Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that 2 copies of the foregoing Brief and Addendum
were mailed this 5th day of February 1997, postage prepaid to:
Sam Primavera (5413)
Attorney for Appellee and Cross Appellant, Dwane Sykes
746 E. 3800 N.
Provo, Utah 84604

Spencer F. Hatch
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1682
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2530-2586

Trespass Testimony at Trial

2705-Etc.

Trial Transcript ~ Misc. Citations
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Attorney for Defendant/Appellant,
Howard F. Hatch
1433 Lakeview Drive, Suite 100
Bountiful, Utah 84010-1514
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DENNIS L. SYKES, DWANE J.
SYKES and PATRICIA SYKES,
APPELLANT'S MOTION
FOR EXTENSION OF TIME
TO FILE REPLY BRIEF

Plaintiffs, Appellee and
Cross-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 960561-CA
HOWARD F. HATCH,
Defendant, Appellant and
Cross-Appellee.

-1
Defendant/Appellant, Howard F. Hatch, moves the Court to grant an
extension of time of 30 days in which to file Appellant's Reply Brief,
extending the time to file from January 6, 1997 to February 5, 1997.
Counsel for Appellant and Appellee are both in agreement in
requesting that said extension be granted.
Respectfully submitted this / /

-I
Sam Primavera
Attorney for Dwane Sykes

day of December 1996
{
&X£'AAJ <rT
Spencer F. Hatch
Attorney for Howard F. Hatch

Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Appellant's Motion for
Extension of Time to File Reply Brief was mailed this / / — day of
December 1996 postage prepaid and addressed to:
Sam Primavera (5413)
Attorney for Dwane Sykes
746 E. 3800 N.
Provo, Utah 84604

Spencer F. Hatch
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DENNIS SYKES, DWANE J. SYKES,
PATRICIA SYKES, AND JOHHNY
IVERSON,
Plaintiff,

MINUTE ENTRY - DEFAULT
ENTERED
CASE NO. 810457127
DATE: JANUARY 5, 1994
JUDGE: DAVID L. MOWER

vs.

HOWARD F. HATCH, ET AL.,
Defendant(s).

REPT. BY: VONDA BASSETT
CLERK: KMJ

This matter came before the Court for Final Pre-trial Conference. Plaintiffs were
not present, nor represented by counsel. Defendant Howard Hatch was present with counsel,
Jeff Hill. Mr. Hill has recently filed his appearance as counsel. Christine Clark, daughter
of plaintiff Johnny Iverson was present.
The Court questioned Mrs. Clark. She advised her attending this matter was to
find out what this matter is all about and whether or not her father needs to be involved.
The Court and above-named individuals discussed Mr. Hatch's allegations in his
complaint, how notice has been made, and the desires of Mr. Hatch in proceeding with this
matter.
Mr. Hill requested that a default be entered against Dennis Sykes, Dwane Sykes,
and Patricia Sykes and that judgment enter against the said individuals upon presentation of
evidence. The Court granted the request and ordered Dennis Sykes, Dwane Sykes, and
Patricia Sykes defaulted in this matter. The Court to take evidence before judgment is
ordered.
The Court ordered the trial date to remain and will await to determine if Mr.
Iverson has filed documentation regarding, this case.

Mrs. Clark was advised that should her father desire to file documentation, it is to
be filed here, in Provo, at this courthouse. Mr. Hill was required by the Court to provide a
computer 3.5" disc to Judge Mower with his jury instructions. Mr. Hatch is not willing to
waive a jury. Original jury instructions are to be filed with the Clerk's Office.
Twenty-five prospective jurors will be called for the selection process. This matter
will be recorded by audio cassette. The trial in this matter will begin on January 27, 1994 at
9:30 a.m.
Mr. Hill is to prepare the appropriate order in this matter. Mr. Johnny Iverson's
address is: 10400 North, 796 West, American Fork, UT 84003.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

HOWARD F. HATCH,

ORDER ON MOTION TO SET
ASIDE DEFAULT AND
RESCHEDULE

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 810457127

DENNIS L. SYKES, DWANE J.
SYKES, PATRICIA SYKES, AND
JOHNNY IVERSON,
Defendants

Judge David L. Mower

The motion made by Dwane J. Sykes, Patricia Sykes and
Dennis L. Sykes to set aside their default is granted.
motion to reschedule is granted.

The

This matter is referred to the

Court Clerk in Richfield who will work with the Court Clerk in
Provo and with counsel to find an agreeable date for trial.
Signed on February ~X"'\ , 1994.

\MUuDavid L. Mower, Judge

9402221.ut
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Dwane J. Sykes, defendant
Represented by Sam Primavera
c/o 2069 Marylhurst Dr.
West Lynn, Oregon 97068
phone 503-697-3136 [recon sam]
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IN TFIE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH
HOWARD F. HATCH,
Plaintiff,
SYKES' WITNESS LIST
vs.
(PRELIMINARY)
DWANE J. SYKES,

Consolidated Case Nos. 63,695

^577T27>
Defendant.

" 57,125
Hon Judge David L. Mower

Dwane J Sykes lists the following as witnesses which may be called at trial:
C. D. FOUTIN
DEAN ZABRISKIE
PAT WILLIAMS
DWANE J SYKES
DENNIS L. SYKES
PATRICIA SYKES
MARK SYKES
JIM WILBUR
MARK HALL
WAYNE PINDER
JOHN BECKSTEAD
GVVEN EMMETT
RODNEY DEAN
SIDNEY GILBERT
MARK ROBINSON
CHRIS CANNON
ERMA PACE
ARNOl .D BROWN
HOWARD HATCH
MARJOR1E 11ATCII
LEE "PONY" BROOKS
LEON PETER PIEROTTI
KAREN PIEROTTI
RUTI1 RAGOZZINE
JEAN TANNER
WAYNE TANNER
OREM POLICE RECORD'S OFFICER
STEWARTS TITLE OFFICER
MR
CARR, SURVEYOR
MR.
JURASIC (sp?), SURVEYOR
W. S. GARDINER, SURVEYOR
OFFICER, UTAH COUNTY REAL ESTATE. COMMISSION
OFFICER, UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION
CARL LYMAN
BILL POPE
JOESEPH JINKENS
, PROVO FORMER TEMPLE PRESIDENT
RHINWALD LIECHTY
ALL WITNESS ON MR. HATCH'S WITNESS LIST
ALL PERSONS ON SYKES' 3-PAGE LIST FILED IN THE 1980's OF HOWARD HATCH'S
DISSATISFIED BUSINESS ASSOCIATES

Howard F. Hatch,
843 South 1150 East
Pleasant Grove, UT 84602
Ph: 785-4818 / 785-8000
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DENNIS L. SYKES, DWANE J. SYKES,
AND PATRICIA SYKES,
Plaintiffs,
v^.

)
)
]

ORDER
Civil No. 810457127

1

HOWARD F. HATCH

Judge David L. Mower

Defendant.
The
1994

above entitle matter came before the Court on

at 10:00 a.m.

September

for a hearing on motions of the parties and

2,
pur-

suant to the Court's Notice of Oral Argument and Scheduling Conference
mailed

August

designated

22,

the

1994.

In attendance were:

Defendant),

Howard

F.

Hatch,

the Plaintiff
pro

se;

A.

(now
Samuel

Primavera, who represents the balance of the active parties, Dennis L.
Sykes,
son

Dwane J. Sykes and Patricia Sykes.

As was noted, Johnny Iver-

has been dismissed as a p^rty pursuant to a

stipulation

between

his attorney and the Defendant Hatch.
A discussion was had on the only outstanding motion not previously

ruled upon,

considerable
Court
that

to wit,

argument

Plaintiffs' Sykes Motion in
on both sides and

rendered its decision.

careful

The Motion in Limine

Limine.

After

deliberation,
which

the

requested

all evidence in this case be limited to matters occurring

prior

to August 28, 1981, was denied.

1

1/1/1/1

The

time needed to conduct a jury trial was discussed and it was

determined

that

six (6) days would be allotted,

through the 10th and the 13th,
jurists

will

be

1995.

namely February

6,

Approximately thirty potential

summoned in order to have the

necessary

eight

to

constitute the jury which will try the matter.
The
each

discussion of time needed brought up the matter of witnesses

of

people

the parties would be planning
will

to

call.

be expected to appear as witnesses.

Approximately

22

Each side will

be

limited to no more than 6 "cliaracter" witnesses, going to the issue of
credibility.

Each

present his case,

side will be allowed approximately 17

including time spent on redirect.

hours

to

According to the

court clerk, a court stenographer will be used to report the trial.
Howard Hatch, while technically the Defendant for the purposes of
titling
trial

the
and

consolidated cases,

it will be his burden to establish his

opposing parties,
the

role

will have the role of Plaintiff

who,

against

while denominated the Plaintiffs,

of Defendants at trial.

1994.

will have until October 9,

the

will be in

Howard Hatch has been ordered

prepare his list of witnesses by October 2nd,
representing the Sykes,

case

at

to

Sam

Primavera,

1994,

to respond

with his list of witnesses.
Notice

as

to any additional discovery required by

the

parties

will be given the opposing party no later than October 31,

1994,

and

must

Since

such

be

discovery

completed no later: than December

31 s t,

1994.

may lead to the need for additional witnesses,

shall have until January 9_,__

the parties

1_99J3, to submit to the opposing party its
2

1443

final

witness

list.

A certificate shall be filed

with

the

Court

noting that such a list has been served on the opposing party.
Also due by January 9,

1995,

is a comprehensive set of exhibits

expected to be referred to during trial.

These are to be submitted to

the clerk's office by said date for marking.
retained
date

An extra set should

be

by the parties with evidence of mailing on or before the due

properly identified with a cover page containing the

title

and

number of this case.
BY THE COURT THIS

DAY OF S E P T E M B ^ R X 1 9 9 4 .

;:ij\\^W *H»J III**? DAVID L. MOWER
''•;•*.

••• ? r * * * * '

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Order was mailed, postage prepaid,
ties this

jy?

proposed

to attorney for the opposing par-

day of September, 1994, at the address noted below:
Sam Primavera, Esq.
3707 N. Canyon Rd. Suite 1A
Provo, UT 84604

and that the original and courtesy copy were mailed to Judge Mower
Richfield, Utah.

i -vrr~

3

Howard FT^'atl

in

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I
duly

certify

executed

that a true and correct copy of the
by Judge Mower was mailed,

postage

following named parties or their attorney this 7th

foregoing
prepaid,
day of

Order
to

the

December

fSjeftypfcflftyifrp,

1994, at the address noted below:
Howard F,.'-liatQh"'
fr-4 3 S . / l ' l 5 0 / £ a s t
PI v , £ r o v e , / U T 8 4062

A. Samuel Primavera, Esq.
3707 N. Canyon Rd. Suite 1A
Provo, UT 84604

Dwane Sykes, e t a l . , 1511 South C a r t e r v i l l e Rd, Orem, UTJfe

4
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ARGUMENT
Dwane
under

Sykes

the

failed

or refused to give the

discovery

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for over a year and

until this court finally ordered them heldf

required
a

at least those Mr.

half
Sykes

had with him in the courtroom, so they could be examined.
It took me, the defendant Howard Hatch, the better part of a year
in 1983 to get copies of a few originals,
Memorandum of April 18,
are

see page 6 of Hatch's Reply

1983 attached as Exhibit "A" (only pages

provided since these alone concerned the discovery

4-7

matter).

See

also Affidavit of Howard Hatch dated November 11, 1982, Exhibit "B".
We
ments,

were able to obtain quite a number of copies of copied
all

of them clearly discoverable,

but only after a

docu-

terrible

fight with Mr. Sykes and his attorney, and only after the court specifically

intervened and ordered them provided

25, 1982).
as

(Minute Entry of October

See Affidavits of Howard Hatch and Aaron Jepson, attached

Exhibits "C S^ D^_ and also found on file in this case.
Mr.

Sykes comes to this court begging for special

with very "dirty hands".
judicial

process,

and

consideration

He has done all in his power to subvert the
now he expects this court to violate its

own

order to accomodate him in his very late and dilatory request.
It is clear to me that it is a tactic to either put off the trial
or to cause enough confusion as to make it impossible for me to put in
the

time

necessary to properly

subpoena witnesses,

prepare,

i.e.

identify

documents,

prepare jury instructions, organize the presenta-

tion, etc. 0£ i_n the alternative to have a basis for arguing on appeal
o

1

^7*7
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Dwane J. Sykes, Defendant pro se
1511 So. Carterville Rd.
Orem, UT 84058
ph. 801-225-0686 [witness]

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

HOWARD F. HATCH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

AMENDED WITNESS LIST (SYKES)

(consolidated)
DENNIS SYKES, DWANE J.
SYKES, and PATRICIA SYKES,
Defendants.

CV. 810457127
CV. 810457125
CV. 830463695
Judge David L. Mower

Dwane 0. Sykes lists the following as witnesses which may be called at trial:
CLIFFORD D. FOUTIN
DEAN ZABRISKIE
PAT WILLIAMS
DWANE J. SYKES
DENNIS L. SYKES
PATRICIA SYKES
MARK SYKES
HAROLD DUDLEY
MARK HALL
WAYNE PINDER
JOHN BECKSTEAD
GWEN EMMETT
RODNEY DEAN
SIDNEY GILBERT
MARK ROBINSON
CHRIS CANNON
ERMA PACE
ARNOLD BROWN
HOWARD HATCH
MARJORIE HATCH
LELAND G. "PONY" BROOKS
LEON PETER PIEROTTI
KAREN PIEROTTI
ANTHONY RAGOZZINE
RUTH RAGOZZINE
CARR GREER, SURVEYOR
AUTHUR F. JUESCHKE, SURVEYOR
W. S. GARDINER, SURVEYOR
STACEY SMITH
OREM POLICE RECORD'S OFFICER
STEWARTS, & ROWLEY LAND TITLE OFFICERS
OFFICER, UTAH COUNTY BOARD OF REALTORS
OFFICER, UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION
OFFICER, UTAH COUNTY RECORDERS OFFICE
ALL WITNESS ON HOWARD HATCH'S WITNESS LIST
REBUTTAL WITNESSES
V. LEE BUDELL
4TH HIST. COURT FXIT.U H V L / M O H I N L S R A fOR

BILL J. POPE
W. RHINWALD LIECHTY
JAMES MASON
FRED BOWMAN
WILLIAM DYER
CHRISTOPHER LYMAN
PRES. HAROLD GLEN CLARK
THOMAS H. BROWN
OLIVE HAUETER
DEWAYME YEARSLEY
DOUGLAS L. SMOOT
RONALD MASON
GRANT A. FARRER
DR. JOHN M BOWEN
SID FRANKEL
BRYCE D. McEUEN
FLORENCE LEICHTY
MARJORIE ROSCHER
JOSEPH A. JENKINS, BROKER
JOSEPH J. JENKINS, MAYOR
KARL R. LYMAN
I. DARRELL BUSHNELL
THOMAS C. LAMOREAUX
DON NORTON
DALE JEFFS
SHARON P. Y0SH1KAWA
inARLENE THOMAS
DARRELL R. STACEY
JOHN A. NILSEN
JACKIE WILLIAMS
SAM PRIMAVERA
DENNIS SHIRLEY
RALPH CARTER
BOYD PARK
& TRIAL
ROYAL K. HUNT
MARK EMMETT
DAN PRICE
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FILED C'1 [
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

CARMA B. ^frtfTH, Clerk
Deputy
DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY, UTAH

Dwane J. Sykes,
Plaintiff,

ORDER REGARDING COURT
AVAILABILITY

vs.

Ciisc No. SI0.157127

Howard F. Hatch,

Assigned .finite: David 1.. Mower

Defendant

This case has most recently been governed by an order signed on December 2, 1994.
The order arose out of a hearing held on September 2, 1994, at which Mr. Sykes was not
present, but at which his then-attorney, Mr Primavera, was present
At the hearing the parties agreed to be bound by certain limits at the trial so that it
could be concluded within the time available to the Court. The limits included both time
limits and limits as to the total number o( witnesses to be called.
The parties have now filed then witness lists. The number of witnesses m Mr. Hatch's
list does not exceed the limit.
Mr. Sykes has filed two witness lists, the first o\\ January 9 i 1995 and the second on
January 27, 1995. The first list contains (') 1 names or titles o\ people. The second contains 73.
These numbers exceed the limit. In fact, these numbers greatly exceed the limit.
That excess is the reason for this order.
The Court is not willing to provide it resources and the community's resources to Mr.

ORDER REGARDING COURT AVAILABILITY, Case number 810457127, Page -2Sykes to aid him in the resolution o( this dispute when he will not comply with the case
management order. The Court has committed its resources for six days. In addition, the Court
will use its power to bring 30 citizens of Utah County to the courthouse to be interviewed for
potential jury service. Eight of those citizens would then remain for the balance of the six
days.
It is impossible to complete a trial with upwards o\s 100 witnesses within six days.
It appears to me that Mr. Sykes is intent upon thwarting the Court in its desire and
responsibility to resolve disputes. 1 intend to sanction Mr. Sykes lor doing this.
Several months ago sanctions were imposed on Mr. Sykes. for his failure to follow
case management orders. The sanction imposed on that occasion was dismissal of his claims
against Mr. Hatch.
The only remaining sanction appears to be to enter his default and remove him from
lhe| balance of this case.
Consequently, this ORDER IS THE DEFAULT of Mr. Sykes. He will not be allowed
to appear and defend this action.
The Clerk is directed NOT TO ('ALL any potential jurors in this case because (I) it
appears that Mr Hatch is having a problem seeming the attendance of a witness, and (2) 1
don't believe Mr. Hatch is entitled to present his evidence to a jury when there will be no
opposing party.
This Court, sitting with the undersigned, without a jury, will be in session on February

ORDER REGARDING COURT AVAILABILITY, Case number 810457127, Page - 3 6, 1995, 10:00 am, at the Fourth District Courts building, 125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah.
The Court will be available to receive evidence from Mr Hatch or to react to any other
j

requests that he might make. Mr. Hatch will be entitled to such relief as is proved by
competent, sufficient evidence.
Dated this /

day of February, lc)c)5.

v— u

r *

A/

W^

David L. Mower / ^ * . v ' ^ £ f * ^
Judge
cU^^o^^^L

^^L £££c-f>-et-<>*i~JL

1
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
r h r
On February / - , 1995 a copy of the above ORDER REGARDING COURT
AVAILABILITY was sent to each of the following by the method indicated:

Addressee
Howard F. Hatch
801-785-7534

MetiuHljM.,.!. „, r,,s„„,t.,x)
\V\

Addressee
Dwane J. Sykes
801-225-0686

Method (KM,.»..pci-«m..F:IX
[F]

17^

n>,o 'l'-i, rrl \
*".)o

i f->r-Jt iUW'«-

Y

f^'

1 ^ In t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l District Court,
F O R COUNTY O F UTAH, S T A T E O F UTAH

DENNIS L. SYKFS, OWANF ,1. SYKFS %

\

PATRICIA SYKES,

Plaintiff.

/

SUBPOENA

versus
HOWARD F. HATCH

Case No. £10457127

Defendant, '
THE STATE OF UTAH SENDS GREETINGS TO:

WE COMMAND YOU. That all and singular business and excuses being laid aside, you appear
and attend before the Fourth District Court of the State of Utah, 125 North 100 West. Provo City.
at a term of said-Court to be held on the
at

/ \3 0

o'clock

t2_H

day of February

£) m., in courtroom #202

AD.. 19 25

.

, before Judge David Mower

.

You are then and there to testify in the above entitled action now pending in said District Court on
the part of Howard Hatch

and disobedience will be punished as a

contempt by said Court.
WITNESS: The Hon _HiivlcL_L^..itoWErL

.Judge

of the fourth Judicial District in and for the State of Utah

this

MJil^^

da

Y

of

January

A.D.. 1995

ATTEST, my hand and seal of said Court the day and year
last above written.
Carma B. Smith
-/

sn.,

SX

v

• By

''y '-'i.: nw

1 •"

&4IS»

Clerk

Deputy Clerk

1

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY

2

STATE OF UTAH

3

XXX

4
5
6

HOWARD HATCH

7
8
9
10

(— i

Plaintiff

HI

I

e£3=ffiEB3rl

NO.

810457127

PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT

vs.
DWANE SYKES
Defendant

11
12
13

Be it remembered that on July 13, 1995 the Partial

14

Transcript was electronically recorded before the Honorable

15
16
17

Judge Mower at the Sanpete District Court House. And was
transcribed

by Richard C. Tatton, a certified shorthand

reporter and Notary Republic for the State of Utah.

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

7
0

l/i/7

J

A ,1
2
3
4
5

about that it not be an automatic two thirds 1 isting as the
total

amount

8

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

It

damages.

would

be

merely

a

percentage of that liability which at that po int, well his
liabi.lity (^ould be 100 percent.
THE COURT:
got

to rule on

So even if money is paid then I've still

a Judgement

NOV

and

the amount

of

that

judgement is open to argument.

9
10

the

determinat:Lon of Mr . Sykes, Dwane Sykes>, total liability and

6
7

of

MR. ROMNEY:

It can be the same as the amount which

has already been determined against all three and it can be
somewhat

less.

It

could

be

any

figure

that

you

would

determine to be fairly reasonable.
THE COURT:

I think that is what you were saying

too, isn't it Mr. Nielsen?
MR. NIELSEN: I don't disagree with that to the
extent that the court would then make that decision on not
just the judgment NOV, but the motion from the trial.
THE COURT:

All right.

MR. NIELSEN:

And

those motions would

then be

determined by the court with respect to Mr. Sykes. Mrs. Sykes,
Dennis Sykes, they're out of the picture.
other party.

They're gone, no

Now the court may well determine that based upon

the evidence that Mr. Sykes is then responsible based upon the
evidence in the trial Mr. Sykes would be responsible for 100
percent of whatever damages that were incurred under the evidence.

1
2

THE COURT:

with the money is the dismissal against Dennis and Patricia?

3

MR. NIELSEN:

4
5

THE COURT:

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

That's correct.

And you're not buying the resolution of

anything else.

6
7

So if the money is paid what you buy

MR. NIESLEN:

Well, he is buying, if the court

please, I'm not going to come back and argue that Mr. Sykes
is only liable for 33 and a third percent under the jury's
verdict.
THE COURT:
MR.

ROMNEY:

absolutely can't be.

And that's what you were just saying.
I would

absolutely

say

that

that

You can't use a formula saying that he

therefore only owes one third. Because under your decision it
may very well be that it's possible that he is very totally
liable for the whole amount. The amount may vary.
THE COURT: So you want to have the possibility that
if I grant the motion for Judgement Notwithstanding that the
amount could be equal to the current judgement?
MR. ROMNEY:

Yes, it certainly could be.

It could

be higher.
MR. NIELSEN: No, I don't think so.
THE COURT: Well, it has got to be equal to whatever
the evidence shows.
MR. ROMNEY:

That's right.

THE COURT: And Mr. Dwane Sykes would be 100 percent

8

1
2

MR. ROMNEY:

3

MR. NIELSEN:

4

I I

liable for it?
Well, I would certainly hope so.
Could be.

The court may make that

determination.

5

THE COURT: If the money is paid and you buy the

6

dismissal of Dennis and Patricia then there is only one person

7

left to be liable and that is Dwane.

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

MR. ROMNEY:

So he would be responsible for 100

percent of whatever you decide.
THE COURT:

Whatever I decided and that is the

result that you want to reach to.
MR. ROMNEY:

That was my argument.

That was my

argument that I endeavored to make this morning is that under
the Judgment NOV these two people have to be dismissed because
they did nothing. Whatever damages there are are his damages.
They want to try and settle it under, it seems to me Your
Honor, under the theoretical legal perspective and the legal
process procedure would be that if you have a jury verdict
that says 33 and a third, 33 and a third, 33 and a third you
allow two of those, the remaining person is only liable for
33 and a third, and

without

any

if you

agreement

let

them

out

with

I would

jury v e r d i c t

as 33 and

Then

have

I would

going

to do

judgment

that

NOV

and

with

here

are

think

That

as one

damages

is as
can

award

or

judgment.
I think
you

that would

anything

that now is the

They

should
for

complete

100

per

I had made my

concerned

any

po

damages

caused

by M r . S y k e s , not by

established

by
the

to a confession

off this

I

We are

quite

are

here

It

place
to

this

is not a

pay that

problem

amount.

to argue

off,

for

be a 100 per c e n t .

the total

going

do pay

If they

a different

time and

be a very

people

judgment.

amount.

up or down

if they

if these

left would

MR. N I E L S E N :
to a r g u e .

my

and

factor

make

think

out

we

that

are

not

show.

Your Honor, this would

agreement

be adjusted

find

I am

get.

could

we

thought

the

proper

It is an agreed

because

NOV.

to

it i s .

is liable

c l o s e , I g u e s s , as

intervening
this

is all

to w i t h d r a w

if Mr. Sykes

and

MR. ROMNEY:
important

that

I think

far as we are

as

assessed

others.

to argue

the damages

today.

I certainly

but

the e v i d e n c e

and

to what

here

today

or w h a t e v e r .

were

a third

regard

the a r g u m e n t

that

be entitled

I am not going

to argue

this m o r n i n g

be entitled

withdrawn my judgment

are entitled

cent

him, I would

That

I don't
that

until

pay.

I think

now

to argue

it.

is the
I have

time
already

said

10

1

that TOO per cent is 100 per cent. If these two people are

2

out and

3

shows

what

4

out.

The e v i d e n c e

5

in this case

he

6

is

in, my

the e v i d e n c e

were

THE
process

8

at the evidence

and

see what

11

jury's

12

has

verdict,

the

power

13

MR.

14

restrictions

15

isn't

if

it

MR.

NIELSEN:

19

can do

is argue

20

is all

there

because

22

process

23

paid,

24

for w h a t e v e r

25

is

look

enough,

than

then

the

the

court

verdict.

the

is bound

facts

and

by
the

court

Right.
And

that

the

I certainly

is not

evidence

proper
only

can't

argue

argument.

shows one

that

to

What I

result and

that

is.
COURT:

of changing

then

do

the

that.

17
the court

through

if it is different

just weighing

COURT:

18

suffered

is c o r r e c t .

W e l l , the court

THE

THE

to go

NIELSEN:

to do

were

v e r d i c t , what you

is different

16

21

going

the jury's

to

is in or

of Mr. S y k e s .

to change

as

going

And

of who

evidence

it j u s t i f i e s .

That

THE C O U R T :

The

damages

as a result

jury's

MR.NIELSEN:

10

regardless

If you are
the

change.

that whatever

suffered

of c h a n g i n g

doesn't

shows

shows

COURT:

7

9

position

there

And
the

is only

decision

MR. N I E L S E N :

if I am going
jury's

verdict

one possible

to go through
and

person

the

the

monies

to be

liable

I make.
That

is co r r e c t .

11

1

THE

COURT:

2

MR . N I E L S E N :

3

THE C O U R T :

4

to have M r . R o m n e y ,

5

of

6

I was

7

the

that

and maybe

going

source

And

to do

it, there

of that

payment

THE
to complete

are

13

at

14

the

15

finish my

16

to give me

17

respond

18

able

here and
some

21
22
23

entire

date

day

would

here.

to and

I think

aren't

made

Then

have

past which

we would

not

they

don't.

I think

back

and

in fairness
and

argue.

I hate

on

would

be

that.
want

have

and

back

We have
I think

we
again

spent

! can

ask the

court

Five to ten minutes
that we

basis

to argue

please

I will

anything

on the

that

MR. N I E L S E N :

If

To come

no purpose.

as s c h e d u l e d , we might
We might

based

to -lr'jue.

In the event

argument.

NOV.

are saying you

at the end,

argue

MR. ROMNEY:

result

Dwane?

if the court

in 10 minutes

don't

person

want

today?

serve

five minutes

is

is correct

pre,),) red

argument

that

I think

to M r . R o m n e y .

24
25

wo are

later

19
20

the arguments

that you

the judgment

is only one

Mow what you

MR. N I E L S E N :

12

grant

and

That

COURT:

is a result

whatever amount is the

I wouldn't

9

11

that

because

MR. R O M N E Y :

is D w a n e .

That is c o r r e c t .
And

8

10

that

of our

that

aren't
memoranda.

the

payments

have quite

a different

as to which

to do

if they did

is the time

in the
pay

and

it not

now.

In that event, then we will

come

to come

the

back

to do

just

to

tc avoid

12

1
2

basis, that we were entitled to_.tJie_ri.ght_ to. have ...,
attorney's fee.

3
4
5

THE COURT:

You can't hire a lawyer because you can't afford one, is
what's happening to you.

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

MR. HATCH:

21
22
23
24
25

Well, I've been bled white in the

past, Your Honor, because of the extent of it.

Mr. Sykes

has been allowed to manipulate the Court system for
fourteen years.

The latest was that extension from one

year to the next.

Now he is tryingto. manipulate it

f ux.th ex .by... s ay.i ng_"Give us a new trial/'

I think, .a enouglL-

is enoitghHt_YAur...HQjnLQ3Lx.„a.![Ld.jL.JU^ink it ought to be denied
the motion, themotion ought to be totally denied.

He has

had his day in Court, he has had his opportunity for
fourteen years to fend off, to shuffle around, to try to
keep us from going to the real issue.

We finally got to a

jury; it didn't/ithem very long to decide what was really
going on in the case.

19
20

So right now it is financial for you.

THE COURT:

That is your basic argument, isn't

MR. HATCH:

I would also argue that I don't think

it?

this Court has the latitude of overriding the jury to that
extent and I have cited those cases in my memorandum in
this regard.

T|iel..Boren vs.... Moor encase, trial burns

without power to change the jury's verdict or render a
41

ZS3o

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

for the State of Utah, at least it has been represented to
me that he is a member of the Utah State Bar.

know, and I imagine, I am sure it is just conjecture on my
part.

11
12
13

client.

16

economics and so...on...
I think that the Court can condition the setting aside
that Mr. Sykes will have an attorney, who will appear and
who will remain an attorney and can get that commitment
because you've already got that commitment from Mr.
Primavera.
And on the second part of it, I think that the Court
can adequately manage the case to keep everything in
balance and which, what would be appropriate.

17
18
19
20
21
22
23

There is alot to be said for justice and fairnes_s.t_

-that goes far beyond the issue of fees and_p_rof.i_t_ and

14
15

I don't imagine that he is charging him for it

anymore than I represent to the Court, I am not charging...my..-

9
10

I don't

THE COURT:

I .dqn'.tmean .to indicate by my

questions about what my intentions on about this motion
are.
MR. NIELSON:

I understand, Your Honor.

THE ...COURT:.. Because J

keep going hack and forth-

in, .my own mind,, when I.. listen to you Mr. Nielson, I think,
wjell, maybe I ought to grant it. .Then I listen to Mr-

24
Hg±ch,..._hesays_jr3g_ugh__iq.^.e:.no.u.gh._..and„ thatj:.s^-Xaixi^_^±XQng_
25

,axjgjum_ent;.._.

55

ISty

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

the only relationship that was involved here was the
relationship between Mr. Hatch and this Ms. Carlisle who
was going to come in ...
THE COURT:
MR. NIELSON:

And buy it.
And put up the $25,000 for it.

I will come back to the amount.

And

Mr. Hatch has made a big

to do in the trial that he ought to recover from Mr. Sykes
for the damage to the property and that the property is now
valued at upteen thousands of dollars.

I think the Court

was correct in telling the jury that what .you. ..can only
award.,!s the value of the property at the time1 of the loss.
That was according to the real estate appraiser, who was
not a witness on Mr. Hatch's witness list, the Court
allowed to testify the value of the property at between

15
J>30j.0.00 .and$35,000 an acre for..__thr_e.fi_acxejS-^ So you could
16
say well that her value was $90,000 on the low end or
17
$105,000 on the upper end.

It was not presented to the

18
jury in that form but it should have been.

gut the jury

19
foundthat .....the property was worth $.1 0 5 , .0 QXL-20
What the jury failed to take into account and what the
21
evidence is clear and undisputed it is that not only was,
22
it should have also taken into account and reduced the
23
value of the property by what Mr. Hatch's equity was.

In

24
other words, Mr. Hatch suffered only damages for the amount
25
of... his equity in the property.

Nov; the property may have
78

ZSty

1

been valued at $105,000, but he had a $25,000, at least a

2

$25,000 mortgage, a trust deed was signed to the bank on

3

that property.

4
5
6
7

I'm, again if you look at the evidence in the light most
favorable to Mr. Hatch, the evidence really only indicates
that it was $25,000.

THE COURT:

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Because that is what Ms. Carlisle was

going to come in and pay.

10
11

There is no evidence of a higher

amount that I am aware of.

8
9

Now it might have been more than that but

MR. NIELSON:

That's right.

So whatever Mr.

Hatch lost, if he lost anything, but it had to be reduced
by the amount of that obligation that he had to pay,
$25,000.

If he had not lost the property or if the

property had not been lost then there would have only been
a value in it, a value of the property less the amount he
had to pay Zions.

But in addition, if you are going say

that UADA really doesn't have any meaning or whatever, I
don't how you can avoid UADA, but if you do do that then
you and I, I mean we have to then look at the trustee on
that part of the property, too, because the UADA
partnership had a trustee on the property for $30,000.

So

there is another $30,000 obligation that had to be repaid.
And so the value of the property based on the undisputed
evidence would have been reduced by $55,000 or in other
words, Mr. Hatch's equity, in fact the equity of later UADA
79

Zs^

1
2
3

would only have been $105,000 less those amounts.

other words, Mr. Hatch had an equity in the property of
$50,000.

4
5
6

So _in

THE COURT:
on this now.

Lei me see if I got, if I am with you

We had an expert come and say the value of

this property is at such and such a date was between $30

7
and $35,000 dollars.
8
MR. NIELSON:

That is correct.

Market value,

9
fair market value.
10
11

THE COURT:

Okay.

the jump from there to 105.

Now I am not sure how we make
You said it but I...

12
MR. NIELSON:

Well there are three acres, $35,000

13
per acre.
14
THE COURT:

Per acre.

15
MR. NIELSON:

I'm sorry.

16
, THE COURT: ) Okay, so we multiply, we take 35 and
17
multiply it by three therein is 105.

Then you take off 25

18
for that was obligation to Zions and 30 which was the
19
obligation of UADA and that is how you calculate 50.
20
MR. NIELSON:

Yes, Your Honor.

21
THE COURT:

Okay, I am with you now.

22
MR. NIELSON:

Those are obligations that are

23
undisputed on the record.
24
THE COURT:

So that's got to be the limit of the

25
damages for the slander of title combined with the
80

ZStf

1
2

MR. NIELSON:

No objection to that document to

being...

3

THE COURT:

Okay, I will look at copy of number

MR. HATCH:

Right after, Your Honor, it says

4
85.
5
6
convey in warrant, in the next line it says "to. be .held in
7
tru.st___t_o secure the repayment of $.30^, 0J30..__

It is clearly a

8
deed in lieu of a mortgage.

It was never intended., to he..3XL—

9
absolute deed.
10
THE COURT:

So if I go with you on that argument,

11
what do I do with Mr. Nielson's argument that I've got to
12
reduce the award of slander of title be this $30,000 that's
13
referred to?
14
MR. HATCH:

I'll come to that, Your Honor, in

15
just a moment.

The point I am trying to make at this time

16
is simply that, now this deed was recorded the day before
17
the foreclosure sale.
18
THE COURT: Signed in '81 but it wasn't recorded
19
until '83.
20
MR. HATCH:

That's right.

The Univexs.ity__A.-y

21
Development Associates is a limited.partnership hac
22
filecL.qn that very day a... petition . to..bankruptcy.

It was a

23
desparate attempt to try to keep the property from being
24
sold at foreclosure.

In the benefit of us as well as Mr.

25
Sykes.
97
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1

HALF OF IT TO MR. SYKES. AND I WASN'T PRESENT, SO I

2

DON'T KNOW WHAT ALL WAS SAID, BUT I'VE GOT TO BELIEVE

3

THAT HE MISREPRESENTED HIS RIGHT TO THAT, WHICH PROMPTED

4

MR. PINDER TO GIVE HIM THAT WATER CERTIFICATE, WHICH HE

5

TOOK AND PROMPTLY HAD RECORDED IN HIS NAME WITH THE WEST

6

SMITH DITCH COMPANY, A LOCAL WATER COMPANY THAT'S

7

INVOLVED.

8
9

I PRESSED DWAYNE TO RECTIFY IT. HE CALLED IT
A MISTAKE.

HE SAID OH, IT WAS JUST A MISTAKE.

I SAID,

10

"RECTIFY IT."

I SAID, "GO INSTRUCT MR. LUDLOW, THE

11

PRESIDENT OF THE WATER COMPANY, TO GET BACK HALF OF THAT

12

STOCK IN MY NAME."

13

EVIDENCE THE DOCUMENTS THAT SHOWED THEY WERE ENTITLED TO

14

.6, THAT'S 6/10THS OF A SHARE OF WEST SMITH DITCH.

15

THAT'S QUITE A BIT OF WATER.

16

ONE SHARE EQUALS OVER 2 0 ACRE FEET.

17

IN THEIR VALUE.

18

THESE ARE VERY HEAVY, THEY'RE VERY CONCENTRATED.

19

SHARE EQUALS OVER 20 ACRE FEET.

20

KEPT PUTTING ME OFF FOR QUITE A LONG TIME. THEN HE

21

BEGAN TO TRESPASS ON THE PROPERTY.

22

ON IT.

23

TO OTHER PEOPLE AND COLLECTED MONEY FOR THE RENTS.

I WILL BE INTRODUCING AS PART OF THE

WITH THE WEST SMITH DITCH
WATER SHARES VARY

SOME ARE TWO ACRE FEET, SOME ONE, FOUR.
ONE

HE REFUSED TO DO THAT.

HE PUT SOME HORSES

I LATER FOUND OUT HE EVEN RENTED MY PASTURE OUT
HE

SK

24 I WAS PICKING THE PIE CHERRIES UNTIL I CHALLENGED HIM ON

I Q

25

£

IT, AND OTHER SUCH ENCROACHMENTS
CREED H. BARKER, CSR

VOL 1-71

2-/05"

1

AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME OR NOT LONG AFTER, HE

2

STARTED POSTING THE PROPERTY "NO TRESPASSING, D. SYKES."

3

HE EVEN PUT SOME LARGE PLACARDS OUT, WHICH I'LL SHOW

4

DURING THE EVIDENCE PHASE, SAYING ANYBODY BUYING THIS

5

PROPERTY OR TAKING AN INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY WILL BE

6

BUYING INTO A LAWSUIT, TRYING TO THREATEN POTENTIAL

7

BUYERS OFF OF THAT PROPERTY.

8
9

I LATER FOUND OUT THAT WHAT HE WAS ATTEMPTING
TO DO -- OH, HE EVEN INTERCEPTED OUR TAX NOTICES.

BUT I

10

LATER FOUND OUT WHAT HE WAS ATTEMPTING TO DO IS MAKE A

11

CLAIM AGAINST THE PROPERTY UNDER THE PRINCIPAL OF

12

ADVERSE POSSESSION.

13

DON'T KNOW EXACTLY WHAT THAT MEANS.

14

UNLESS YOU'RE A LAWYER YOU PROBABLY

ORIGINALLY IT WAS INTENDED TO PROTECT THE

15

RIGHTS OF THE INNOCENT, AND GENERALLY DOES.

SAY YOU OWN

16

A PIECE OF PROPERTY, YOU ASSUME ALL OF THIS IS YOURS

17

THAT'S UNDER FENCE.

18

STRUCTURES ON IT AND IMPROVE IT AND SO ON.

19

SOMEONE COMES UP AND SAYS:

20

THAT PROPERTY.

21

YEARS AND PAYING T A X E S ON IT, YOU H A V E A R I G H T TO

22

N O , IT'S MY P R O P E R T Y .

23

COURT SHOULD RULE THEN IN YOUR FAVOR ON THE BASIS OF

24

ADVERSE POSSESSION.

25 I

AND TENDED TO IT LONG ENOUGH THAT -- YOU ASSUMED IT WAS

AND YOU TAKE CARE OF IT, BUILD
LATER

HEY, MY DEED COVERS PART OF

IF YOU'VE BEEN THERE MORE THAN SEVEN
SAY

AND IF IT GOES T O C O U R T , T H E

IF YOU'VE BEEN THERE LONG ENOUGH

CREED H. BARKER, CSR
VOL T - 11.

YOURS ALL ALONG -- MAYBE IT WAS A DEFECTIVE SURVEY TO
BEGIN WITH.
3 I

MAYBE THE ORIGINAL FARMERS BUILT THE FENCE

TOO FAR, WHATEVER.

4

BUT THAT WAS THE PURPOSE OF IT.

MR. SYKES TRIED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THAT BY

5

OPENLY TRESPASSING ON THE PROPERTY; PUTTING UP SIGNS,

6

AND TEARING DOWN -- EVENTUALLY WHEN IT WAS DECIDED MAYBE

7

WE BETTER SELL THE PROPERTY, BECAUSE I HAD NEED OF SOME

8 I

CASH AT THE TIME -- HE EVEN TOOK OUR FOR SELL SIGNS DOWN
AND THREATENED THE BROKER THAT WAS HANDLING IT WITH DEEP

10 I

TROUBLE IF HE DIDN'T KEEP THE SIGNS OFF.

11
12

THIS IS ALL PART OF WHAT WE WILL CALL
SLANDERING TITLE.

13
14

MR. SYKES:
OBJECT AS NOT CORRECT.

15
16
17

YOUR HONOR, I WOULD LIKE TO

THE COURT:
OVERRULED.

IT'S ARGUMENT, MR. SYKES.

GO AHEAD, MR. HATCH.
MR. HATCH:

AS I STARTED TO SAY, I HAD

18

PREVIOUSLY BORROWED SOME MONEY AGAINST THE PROPERTY.

19

AND I NEEDED TO KEEP THOSE PAYMENTS CURRENT.

20

STRAIGHT NOTE.

21

STRAIGHT NOTES ARE DUE IN A LUMP SUM.

22

F O R E V E R OR 3 0 YEARS TO PAY THEM O F F .

23

T H E Y NEED TO GET R E N E W E D OR THEY H A V E T O BE PAID OFF

24

A LUMP SUM.

25 I

I PUT THE PROPERTY UP FOR SALE.

IT WAS A

AND THE BANKER WILL UNDERSTAND THAT
YOU DON'T HAVE
Y O U H A V E EACH

YEAR
IN

AND THE BANK WAS DEMANDING FULL PAYMENT, SO
MR. SYKES, OR HIS

CREED H. BARKER, CSR
VOL 1 - 7 3

?*7^*7

1

WE'RE ASKING FOR OUR ATTORNEYS' FEES, WHICH

2

WE HAVEN'T HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO FULLY COMPILE, BUT WE

3

THINK IS GOING TO RUN INTO THE RANGE OF 20 TO $30,000

4

FOR COSTS.

5

DAMAGES AS THE COURT MAY DETERMINE IS JUSTIFIABLE FOR

6

WHAT WE CALLED CRIMINAL CHARGES.

7

CONTEXT, BUT THE COURT HAS THE RIGHT, THE OPPORTUNITY TO

8

ASSESS DAMAGES FOR THOSE THINGS; THE SLANDER OF MY NAME,

9

THE ATTEMPTED EXTORTION, THE FORGERY, FOR THE BAD FAITH,

10

MAYBE AS MUCH AS $10,000 FOR SUCH OTHER

THEY'RE CIVIL IN THIS

FOR THE FRAUD AND SO FORTH.

11

I APPRECIATE YOUR PATIENCE IN GIVING ME AN

12

OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN WHERE I'M TRYING TO GO WITH THIS

13

LAWSUIT.

14

THEY HAVE BEEN DETERMINED PROVED BY THE DEFAULT.

15

TO SHOW THE EXTENT OF OUR DAMAGES.

AS I SAY, IT'S NOT TO PROVE THE ALLEGATIONS.

16

THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.

17

THE COURT:

18

THANK YOU, MR. SYKES.

IT'S

DO YOU

WANT TO MAKE AN OPENING STATEMENT?

19

MR. SYKES: J^_DO, YOUR HONOR,

20

THE COURT:

GO AHEAD.

21

MR. SYKES:

I APPRECIATE THAT YOU FOLKS ARE

22

PROBABLY VERY CONFUSED BY SOME OF THE THINGS THAT HAVE

23

GONE ON THIS MORNING, AND THE STATUS OF THIS.

24

YOU WILL EVENTUALLY BECOME UNCONFUSED OR NOT, I HOPE YOU

25

WILL NOT.

WHETHER

CREED H. BARKER, CSR
1-93
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Page 283
[ 1]

A.

Okay.

[2]

Q

Was that executed by you?

[3]

A

Yes, yes. That's my signature.

[4]

Q.

Effective what day?

[5]

A.

November 2nd, 1983.

[ 6]

Q.

Could you capsulize, in the interest of time,

[ 7]

]

what is said in that affidavit?

[ 8]

A.

Basically this is a review of the

[ 9]

circumstances that I experienced relative to the

[10]

controversy between you and Mr. Sykes, relative to

[11]

the sale of the property.

[12]

At the time I at least owned equitable realty, the

[13]

real estate company, and later became the broker for it.

[14]

And during this time we had received a listing, valid

[15]

listing on a piece of property that was owned by you,

[16]

and put a sign on the property. We were running ads in

[17]

the newspaper about marketing the property and getting

[18]

it sold.

[19]

heard some difficulty in that the signs were being

[20]

pushed over on the property.

[21]

signs and posted warning signs, and basically had made

[22]

it very difficult for us in the marketing of the

[23]

property.

[24]
[25]

And then during the course of the sale we

Someone had removed the

And I --

THE COURT: Hang on. Ask another question.
We're getting into an area we need question and answer.

2?/?
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[ 1]

MR. HATCH: I thought in the interest of

[ 2]

time — he was reviewing his affidavit and I believe

[ 3]

that was — would you just --

[ 4]
[ 5]

THE WITNESS: I was basically reviewing the
affidavit and stating —

[ 6]
[ 7]

MR. HATCH: The items he swore to on an
earlier occasion.

[ 8]

THE COURT: Are you offering the affidavit?

[ 9]

MR. HATCH: I am. You bet.

[10]

THE COURT: What about that. Mr. Sykes?

[11]

Number 15.

[12]

MR. SYKES: I would object to this, your

[13]

Honor.

It would be more appropriate to have the

[14]

testimony from him.

[15]
[16]

THE COURT: I agree. Ask him a question
about what happened, if you would.

[17]
[18]

[19]

MR. HATCH: I'm just trying to save the court
some time, your Honor.

a

(BY MR. HATCH) You've already said that you

[20]

were operating the equitable realty company; is that

[21]

correct?

[22]

A.

[23]

realty.

[24]

Q.

[25]

I

That's correct.

I was operating equitable

And you were contacted by Dwane Sykes, the

party in this action, and told to cease and desist your

24/<?
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[ 1]

efforts to market the property?

[ 2j

A.

That's correct.

[ 3]

I had -- I remember at least one phone call;

[ 4]

probably there were several.

[ 5]
[ 6]

I had a letter from him and

THE COURT: This is in 1983 you were
marketing this property?

[7]

THE WITNESS: Umin -

[ 8]

MR. HATCH:

[ 9]

1980 is the date in the

affidavit.

[10]

THE WITNESS: Yeah. I -- the marketing time

[11]

for the property was in February of 1980, that's

[12]

correct

[13]

THE COURT: Why don't you try a proffer,

[14]

Mr. Hatch. You're saying in February -- you think

[15]

mr. thomas would say in February of '80 he was in the

[16]

realty business; he received a listing from you; and he

[17]

went to a piece of property and put signs on it and put

[18]

ads in the paper; is that the proffer?

[19]

MR. HATCH: Yes.

[20]

THE COURT: Mr. Sykes, would you accept that

[21]

proffer?

[22]

MR. SYKES: Yes.

[23]

THE COURT: We've got that. Ask another

[24]

[25]

question.

a

(BY MR. HATCH) You said signs were being

Page 286
[ 1]

torn down?

[ 2]

A.

[ 3]

I'm supposed to just answer questions.

[ 4]

Q.

[ 5]

down?

[ 6]

A.

[ 7]

signs down and he made some other comments, too.

[ 8]

In fact, he sent me a letter with quite a few

[ 9]

promises -- or he declared in there he was going --

[10]

we were going to get involved in a court case, and

[11]

a bunch of other things, if we didn't take our

[12]

signs down and stop trying to sell the property.

[13]

Q.

That's right. We had trouble -- go ahead.

Do you have an idea of who tore the signs

Well, Mr. Sykes told us he was pulling the

And let's get to that other matter.

I think

[14]

you have that. - I'm just trying to identify it by

[15]

number.

[16]

It should be right in that same timeframe.
While she's checking for me, Mr. Thomas. I

[17]

believe you have in your records a copy of the letter,

[18]

demand letter Mr. Sykes sent to you at your office?

[19]

A.

[20]

recall that letter

[21]

Q.

Did he say cease and desist your operations?

[22]

A.

Yeah

[23]

right to sell the property

[24]

a real estate broker.

[25]

commission, and I listed the property and went

I -Tr

' f TI i 11 - rrrr"' ~i'-'

f r~imrirrr—n

Right.

TIT-m-wrm-—i

r

I've reviewed that letter, and I do
It's multiple pages.

He basically said we didn't have a

nwrwui I I H T H mi

I had a listing.

I'm

It gives me a right to get a

n mi •• nam i w»u im nm »m

umwi'mi—iw

MR
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about trying to sell it.
Q.

Did he say he owned the property?

A.

He said he had some right to own the

property.

And in fact, I recall in the

conversation saying: "Hey, just show me what
you've got.
broker.

I'm not a judge.

I'm a real estate

I market properties on which I have

listings and we have a plot here. We've got a
listing and we want to sell it." And I did invite
him to come and talk, or he in fact wanted to. I
think, and explain what was going on. But we had
the listing and we were trying to sell it.
I have never, by the way, in my history as a real
estate broker, never had anything like that happen. I
had seen disputes -THE COUhT: Ask another question.

Q.

(BY MR. HATCH) By "anything like that," you

mean like someone challenging the right of a party to
put the property on the market?
A.

Yeah. I've seen disputes where people

thought they owned property or they didn't, but
I've never seen somebody who just came out on
property and just started taking signs down and
sending letters.
like that.

I never received another letter

And I was actively a broker for nearly
n (7 n n

> I I I I »

»*m
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[ 1]

10 years; involved in real estate for quite awhile.

[ 2]

And you know, I saw -- my judgment was Mr. Sykes

[ 3]

was emotionally involved and concerned, but he

[ 4]

didn't -- I had a listing and I was trying to

[ 5]

market a property.

[ 6]

go to the courts and take care of the action. I

[ 7]

was trying to do my job, and I couldn't.

[ 8]

Q.

[ 9]

And if he had action he should

Would you say that that barred you from

selling the property then?

[10]

A.

Absolutely.

I mean, a sign on a property is

[11]

the number one way

[12]

often they get attracted to a particular area.

[13]

They have friends in the area. In this particular

[14]

case it was a unique piece of property, and you go

[15]

by and you want to see a sign up there. That's how

[16]

people buy property. They call in off the signs.

[17]

That's important for us because we get the call, we

[18]

get the prospective buyer, and if we don't sell

[19]

them that property we sell them another property.

[20]

Q

People go into an area -- most

I'm going to show you this sign right here

[21]

marked as exhibit number 14, and see if you recognize

[22]

that

[23]

A.

[24]

sign.

[25]

Q.

1

I really can't say that I recognize that

But Mr. Sykes did say in his demands on you

7 4?.?

lilff.M

In
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[ 1]

that he was posting the property?

[ 2]

A.

Yeah, he said he was putting up signs and

[ 3]

that he would be taking down my signs if I put them

[ 4]

up.

[ 5]
[ 6]

MR. SYKES: At this time I would be happy to
stipulate that sign was put up at the time.

[ 7]

MR. HATCH: I appreciate that.

I was going

[ 8]

to have to ask him as a witness on that, and I

[ 9]

appreciate that

[10]

May I then show it to —

[11]

THE COURT: Can 14 then be received,

[12]

Mr. Sykes?

[13]

MR. SYKES: Yes.

[14]

THE COURT:

[15]
. [16]
I [17]

Q.

14 is received.

(BY MR. HATCH) So he never did say what the

basis of his claimed right was to do that?
A.

Umm I believe that in the course of the

[18]

conversations he explained to me that he had some

[19]

right on the property; that he had some right to

[20]

the property.

I [21]

My understanding -- he said it was

some verbal right

And being a real estate broker

[22]

and training agents, no verbal contract is binding

[23]

at all in real estate. And it would have to be in

[24]

writing. And I kept saying: Well, produce a

[25]

written something. I'm not a judge, and I

Z9LW
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[ 1]

certainly want to support whoever the legal owner

[ 2]

is. But you know, if you have a right to the

[ 3]

property, you have a right to the property.

[ 4]

verbal agreements aren't binding, and I'm going to

[ 5]

sell the property I have a listing on, and at least

[ 6]

I was attempting to do that.

[ 7]

! Q.

[ 8]

But

So y o u h a d every r e a s o n t o believe that the

property d i d b e l o n g t o m e at the t i m e ?

[ 9]

A.

Yeah.

[10]

Q.

And you received -- did you receive anything

[11]
i [12]

from Mr. Sykes to give any indication that he had a
valid right to it?

[13]

A.

I got a big long letter from him that listed

[14]

a bunch of claims and some lawsuits I was going to

[15]

be involved in if I persisted. But I'm a little

[16]

bit -- you know, I'm a little bit independent.

I

I [17]

don't like to back down on things because somebody

I [18]

threatens me with a lawsuit. We made an effort to

[19]

get a letter, but with the signs coming down, it

I [20]

turned out to be so confusing that we took our

I [21]

signs off and stopped trying to market the

[22]

property.

[23]

MR. HATCH: Your Honor, I think I must have

[24]

inadvertently overlooked a letter of Dennis Sykes made

J [25]

upon Steve thomas on February 14th, 1980. and maybe

WZ.
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[ 1]

A.

Yes.

It says here:

[ 2]

"I request again that your equitable realty

[3]

sign come down immediately.

[4]

problems and liabilities with litigation and

[5]

title pending, I think as an owner you should

[ 6]

see that your company is not further involved

[ 7]

and protect you and your company from any

[8]

improper actions of broker."

[9]

Considering the

The way i would have done this -- and this is what

[10]

I'm sure I said over the telephone, I said, "look, I've

[11]

got a listing. I'm going to get a buyer. When that

[12]

buyer comes in. if you have a claim to title you can

[13]

contest the claim to title.

[14]

listing, make my broker's fee and market the property.

[15]

And this letter is really great.

[16]

issues.

[17]

but they don't relate to the issue, which is: I had a

[18]

listing on a property and I was trying to sell it.

[19]
[20]

I just want to do my

It brings up a lot of

I mean, there's tons of things going on here,

THE COURT: You're offering number 49, right,
Mr. Hatch?

[21]

MR. HATCH: Yes.

[22]

THE COURT: And you made your objections

[23]

before, and you're sticking by your objections?

[24]

M R SYKES: 49 is the February 8 letter?

[25]

THE COURT: I don't know if 1 heard a date.

2-W
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[ 1]

to. I would like to offer that into stipulation right

[ 21

now.

[ 3]
[ 4]
[ 5]

THE COURT: What are you offering to
stipulate?
MR. SYKES: I put up all the signs Mr. Hatch

[ 6]

is trying to prove I put up.

I refused to let people

[ 7]

come on the property.

[ 8]

alleging I did to the property.

[ 9)

dispute, but 1 did rt. And there's no reason going over

[10]

all of that, and I tried to stipulate to that before.

I did all the things he's
Why I did is in

[11]

THE COURT: Mr hatch?

[12]

MR. HATCH: That makes me wonder why he's

[13]

asking Mr. Thomas.

[14]

Actually, there's no issue because this court has

[15]

defaulted the Sykes. And all of those are established

[16]

by that default, so obviously there's no question.

[17]

I'm wondering why he's continuing to ask Mr. Thomas

I [18]
[19]
I [20]
[21]

If he stipulated, let it go.

So

questions.
MR. SYKES: I haven't asked a single
question, your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Sykes, there was an exhibit

J [22]

we had that I think was received - I think it was

I [23]

number 14 — and you're saying that's one of the signs

I [24]

you put up? Do you agree or disagree?

[25]

MR. SYKES: Yes. The exhibit he showed is a

Page 303
[ 1]

sign I put up.

[ 2]
[ 3]

THE COURT: Is that number 14,
Ms. Williamson?

[4]

THE CLERK; It is.

[ 5]

THE COURT: You used the word "signs,"

[ 6]

plural. Are you offering to stipulate there are other

[ 7]

signs besides exhibit 14?

[ 8]

MR. SYKES: Several others, your Honor.

[ 9J

THE COURT: Are they here with us today,

[10]

those signs?

[11]
I [12]

MR. SYKES: I think Mr. Hatch has a number of
others.

I [13]
J [14]

THE COURT: Okay. Do they have exhibit
numbers attached to them?

[15]
[16]

MR. SYKES: I do not t h i n k - - d o they,
Howard?

I [17]

MR. HATCH: I only submitted one of several

I [18]

as an example. I just sent my wife out to the car for a

I [19]

big cardboard one that was on our property we took down.

I [20]
I [21]

THE COURT: I'm not trying to tell you what
to put in, just get a boundary line.

I [22]
[23]
[24]
J [25]

MR. HATCH: I only turned in one just as an
example.
THE COURT: So Mr. Sykes, you're offering to
stipulate exhibit 14 is one of several different signs

VmmmmmmmwimmmKmm*jmmi^m:^m»ummmmmnmmmmm
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[ 1]

that you put up?

[ 2]

MR. SYKES: The point is simply Mr. Hatch is

[ 3]

trying to spend a lot of time proving what I did. I

[ 4]

will stipulate as to what I did. There's no contest,

[ 5]

and I tried to stipulate before. The contest is why I

[ 6]

did it and why I was reasonable in doing it. I won't

[ 7]

stipulate to his approach as to why, only what I did.

[ 8]

We don't need to spend a lot of time with this court on

[ 9]

trying to establish what I did. because I tried to do

[10]

this before, three weeks ago.

I [11]
J [12]

MR. HATCH: Lets dismiss the weakest link
then, your Honor.

I [13]

THE COURT: T o r sale" signs appear on the

I [14]

property that say "for sale, equitable realty." and you

I [15]

pushed them over and took them out?

I [16]

MR. SYKES: No. no.

I [17]

THE COURT: You're not stipulating to that?

I [18]

MR. SYKES: That's what I'm going to ask him

I [19]
J [20]
I [21]
[22]
I [23]
I [24]
I [25]

about.
THE COURT: But you put some signs up on the
property; one of which is exhibit 14?
MR. SYKES: Yes. 1 understood, your Honor,
that I owned the properly and I acted in accordance.
THE COURT: I know that's what you believe.
But you're saying you put up signs, one of which is
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[ 1]

exhibit 14?

[ 2]

MR. SYKES: That's correct.

t 3]

THE COURT: Do you accept the stipulation.

[ 4]

Mr. Hatch?

[ 5]

MR. HATCH: I do. your Honor.

[ 6]

THE COURT: Now. you wanted to ask Mr. Thomas

[ 7]

questions?

[ 8]

MR. SYKES: Yes, I do.

[9]
[10]
[11]

[12]

Cross-examination
by mr. sykes:

Q.

Mr. Thomas, I believe you said at one point

[13]

you went down -- first off, is it not true your signs

[14]

are a 4 x 4 sign, at least the ones you're using there,

[15]

that you put up on this property was a 4 x 4 sign, when

[16]

it was not in the property, was about this big.

[17]

(indicating), when it sits two or three feet in the

[18]

ground, it was still about this high?

[19]

A.

[20]

gather customers.

[21]

Q.

[22]

Yes, it was an award winning sign designed to

I believe you testified that you thought you

went out and took the sign down?

[23]

A.

I didn't say I took the sign down. What I

[24]

said is you took the signs down.

[25]

Q.

Okay. Then I stand corrected, if you didn't

zip

Page 333
[ 1]
[ 2]

[ 3]

THE COURT: Now do you want to withdraw the
one that has the sticker covering parts of it.

Q.

(BY MR. HATCH) Let me ask it this way,

[ 4]

Mr. McDonald: Does an option give any possessory rights

[5]

to a piece of property?

[ 6]

A.

No

[7]

Q.

If it gives no possessory rights, then a

[ 8]

person would not be within his legal rights to post

[ 9]

signs on a property saying, "this is my property?"

[10]

A.

I would agree with that.

[11]

Q.

He would have no legal right to trespass on

[12]

the property?

[13]

A.

Correct.

[14]

Q.

You would have no legal right to challenge

[15]

the title of the title holder as having some rights

[16]

superior to his own, unless the option pre-dated the

[17]

title, the deed and title of the then record owner,

[18]

correct?

[19]

A.

Correct.

[20]

Q.

So if a person asserted, or did these things,

[21]

would they not represent a slander of title?

[22]

A.

They would.

[23]

Q.

And the more terrible, that is the more

[24]
[25]

flagrant,

such as the posting of warning signs, anyone

buying this property is buying a lawsuit, asserted by

526
1

money that was going to the trust was all being spent

2

by Mr. Sykes.

3

shape and form.

4

routinely signed a batch of checks in blank and let

5

Mr. Sykes write them out however he wanted.

It was personal funds in every way,
I think Mr. Iverson will testify he

6

MR. SYKES:

Objection, your Honor.

7

MR. HATCH:

Let me ask that as a question.

8

THE COURT:

Go ahead.

9

Q.

BY MR. HATCH:

10

A.

Yes T did.

11

• Q.

12

A.

13
14
15
16

Did you ever do that?

How many at a time?
Maybe 20.
MR. HATCH:

40 maximum.
That's all I wanted to pursue,

your Honor, in that vein.
Q.

Did you ever assert any ownership interest in

the property beyond v/hat shows here marked in black?

17

A.

Are you talking about personally?

38

Q.

No, as trustee for the Sykes children's

19

trust?

20

A.

21

think so.

I don't remember what properties, I don't

22

Q.

Did you ever inspect the property as such?

23

A.

No, I did not.

24

Q.

25

,And you certain] Y_.AS.ser1^d._no^

. _ in ...the_three plus acres to the back of it?

3/ti.

}
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1

A.

2

trust.

3

Q.

4
5

Only as trustee as it would have affected the

Did you put horses on it or

for your own personal
A.

use that property

--

There were horses on it.

6

of JDwayne's and some of —

7

_w_ere •

T understandsome

T don't know who the others_
'

8

Q.

They were not yours?

9

A..

No, not mine.

Q.

So your answer then was you did not use any

10
11

of that, even the trust property out front, you didn't

12

use any of that for your own personal

use?

13

A.

Mo.

14

Q.

You said you knew that there was some kind of

15

dispute going on between Dwayne Sykes and myself; is

16

that correct?

17

A.

That's correct.

18

Q.

Tell me what you knew about it.

19
20

Do you know

what the dispute was about?
A.

No, not particularly.

The only thing that I

21

know about that dispute was we came over to visit them

22

one day and there was a big hole cut through the

23

pyrocantha and I said, "what is going on here?"

24

that's a big hedge going across the front of the

25

property, and T recall a little bit of —

And

seemed like

3U3

578
Tf he has something to mitigate damages or

1
2

would rebut, for example, the appraiser who said

3

properties were such and so the property we lost, if

4

he has somebody to refute that then T would say that's

5

a legitimate witness.
THE COURT:

6
7

witness.

I have at least got to get the

What was the name?

8

MR. SYKE55:

Sid Gilbert.

9

THE COURT:

Mr. Gilbert.

Come up, please.

10

SIDNEY GILBERT

11

called as a witness, having been first duly sworn,
was examined and testified as follows:

12

DTRECT EXAMINATION

13
14/1 BY MR. SYKES
15

Q.

Mr. Gilbert, please state your name and

16

occupation.

17

A.

18

My name is Sidney S. Gilbert.

I am a

certified public accountant.

19

Q.

Are you acquainted with Mr. Howard Hatch?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

Would you indicate in what capacity and for

22

how long?

23

A.

24

years.

25

Q.

I've known Mr. Hatch probably close to 30

In what capacity?

598
MR. HATCH:

1
2

this morning.

3
4

THE COURT:

MR. OLSEN:

Yes, I know this witness and his

name wasn't read prior to the time.

7
8

Mr. Olsen, you wanted to say

something?

5
6

He used 2 5 minutes of my time

THE COURT:

I appreciate you saying that,

Mr. Olsen.

9

MR. HATCH:

10

no problem.

11

morning.

12

I have

He's used 25 minutes of my time this

THE COURT:

13

I'll waive any objection.

Mr. Sykes, go ahead.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

14(1
15

Q.

Would you state your name and your

16

profession?

17

A.

18
19
20
21
22
23

Dale L. Morton, I work for Utah County in the

recorder's office.
Q.

Would you state what the Utah County

Recorder's Office is?
A.

They take in documents and record them of

property owners; real estate in other words,
Q.

And is your role there one of your duties to

24

make certified copies of the official copies for the

25

public?

32-3 f

624
1

could possibly happen.
MR. HATCH:

2
3

MR. SYKES:

5

One final question.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. SYKES?\

7
8

That's all

the questions T have.

4

6

Thank you very much.

Who recorded this document and where was it
sent?

9

A.

Which exhibit?

10

Q-

Number 50, the notice of interest document?

11

A.

Could I see that again and take a look at it?

12

Q.

Was that notarized by Mr. Sykes?

13

THE COURT:

14

THE WITNESS:

15

want to know who brought it in?

16
17
18
19
20

Q.

23

That wasn't the question.

BY MR. SYKES:

You

Who brought it in and who it

was returned to?
A.

It was brought in by a Mr. Zabriskie, Madison

and Zabriskie
Q.

21
22

That wasn't your question.

—

Are you familiar with that?
THE COURT:

Let him answer the question

because you asked who it was returned to.
A.

It shows it was returned to an address in

24

Orem by saying Mr. Zabriskie was an attorney and had

25

his office in Suite 115 at 13 25 South 800 East in

698
1

and he effectively contradicted what Mr. Sykes said,

2

had him say in his affidavit.

3

I can not spend very much time refuting all

4

of the ridiculous statements that Mr. Sykes has made

5

with regard either to our case or trying to prove his

6

case to you, they are too numerous and I have been cut

7

way down on time.

8

T need to give you effectively a summation of

9

what we have tried to prove and what we feel that we

10

have effectively proved to you and this is my facts.
We have had independent witnesses up here and

11
12

documentation to show that all of these things are

13

true, not just my assertions, to prove that they are

14

true.
One, that that water stock was taken.
admitted the stock was taken.
gave it back.

v A / i.

He

He admitted he never

That's clear and simple.

He had been

defaulted on that case; that was open and shut.
That's the reason I took the first item; that was so
obvious, and he admitted that he took it and refused
to give it back.
The trespass.

He admitted that, constantly

going on the property putting up those signs such as
this one right here.
This is one of the actual signs that was

3>^y

699
1

taken down right there.

2

of them.

3

into the record, a warning sign that says essentially

4

the same thing; a different format.

5

Not just one; he had several

There's one of them that's been submitted

He admitted he did all of these things.

He

6

admitted he went in there, he admitted he cut down

7

trees, he admitted he dredged land out of the lake and

8

strewed it all over the pasture and he rented pasture

9

to other people.

He did a dozen things like that in

10

an attempt to try to assert a right by adverse

11

possession.

12

When he saw that wasn't working —

and I have

13

documentation in my file that —

14

him on that check that he altered.

15

Sam allowed us to go beyond the normal limits of

16

gathering evidence, or in other words, discovery, and

17

he said because there's a law that says if you —

18

there's a prima fascia of fraud, a case for fraud such

19

as altering a document as that check was altered, you

20

can go beyond the client privilege.

21

because we did catch
The judge, Judge

if

We were able to discover quite a few

22

documents in his files where he was telling his

23

attorney, "We have got to hang in there a few more

24

years if we're going to get title by adverse

25

possession."
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78-27-68. Attorney's fees — Award where action or
defense in bad faith — Exceptions.
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorneys fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that the
action or defense to the action was without merit and not
brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection (2).
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or.limited
fees against a party under Subsection (1), but only if the court:
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action before the court; or
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not
awarding fees under the provisions of Subsection (1).
1988

Howard F. Hatch, pro se
843 So. 1150 East
PI. Grove, UT 84062
Ph: 785-4818 / 227-6598
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DENNIS L. SYKES, DWANE J. SYKES
et al.
Plaintiffs,
VS.

']
', AFFIDAVIT OF MELVIN J. LUDLOW
I

Civil No. 810457127

HOWARD F. HATCH,
Defendant.

COUNTY OF UTAH
:ss.
STATE OF UTAH
Upon being duly sworn, the Affiant says and deposes as follows:
1.

That

I

am

the Secretary of the West Smith

Ditch

Company

located in Orem and Provo, Utah.
2.

That I have been in that capacity since 1972.

3. That I have examined the records and find that on of September
2,

1975,

1.35909

shares of water stock was transferred from Anthony

and Ruth Ragozzine to Dwane and Patricia Sykes, as Certificate #303*
4.

That

said shares had originated with H.

Vern Wentz in

two

separate certificates, one for 1.2 and another for 0.15909 shares.
5.

That

each share of West Smith Ditch is equivalent to

24.82

acre feet (per year) as determined by the State Engineer's office.
6.

That it is my opinion that each acre foot in the West

Ditch is worth $1,000,

that is,

Smith

I have said that I would not sell my

own for any less.
1.

The

last fully consumated sale was for $600 per acre

foot,

purchased by the CUP? however, in a more recent transaction which went
to escrow, but never closed, the price was set at $805.00 per acre ft.

li

That

i

have sustained a serious injury to the spine and am

therefore physicalU

unable to attend court as subpoenaed.

Further, the Affiant sayeth naught at this time.
DATED:

SWORN

^

n

s\

AND SUBSCRIBED to before me a Notary Public on Er^ 1 \<=V^
S

/S^^Jfcv

NOTARY PI »BUC

DOUGUSLeDOUX

S3

:^N^^^

ft

8 7 1 South Orem Blvd.

Jj

Oram, UT 84068

8j
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Page 1 (of 3 pages)
Oct./Nov. , 1980
Real Estate License Division
Utah Dept. of Business Regulation
330 East 4th South
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 841II
Re; Howard f\ I Id I

licensed real estate Broker

The undersigned persons or their associates feel they have been taken advantage
of or duped or defrauded by actions of Howard F. Hatch considered to be unethical
inept or otherwise improper for a licensed fiduciary of the State of Utah.
Each endorser below has (or knows of) their own particular set of grievances,
intentionally not detailed here. This form of general, group expression is
taken to alert the Real Estate Commission to a pattern (often subtle) which may
reach far beyond the parties listed below (including victims unaware of their
disadvantaged circumstances) which perhaps is not in the public interest and
which warrent investigation by proper authorities.
Address

Name

Lll^_ Zip

Comment

Phone
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ATE OF CttAM' ) ss.
COUNTY OF UTAH )
Each of the various signatures on these pages were personally subscribed and sworn to by
the said person, at different dates during late 1980, personally before me, a Utah Notary
Public. Nearly all signors complained that the wording of this statement was way too mile
and too weak. They wanted stronger complaint statement against Howard Hatch. But I •'
stopped obtaining signatures when 1 realized that there were so many victims of Howard
Hatch who were willing to sign such a statement that I could successfully spend 'ill my
such si S t J b U l n i n 9 "10re s i 9 n a t u r e s > M seemingly endless victims. So,^v^opped'.'.s.efe'k^g
Dec. 20, 1980

U)iWM{W^
Dwane jTTSykbi', N0~TAKY PUBLIC, ST. OF UTAH
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emental page 3 (of 3 pages)
November
, 1980
Real Estate License Division
Utah Dept. of Business Regulation
330* East 4th South
$<rit Lake City, Utah 84111
Re: Howard F. Hatch, licensed real estate Broker
Tfie undersigned persons or their associates feel they have been taken advantage
Of'or duped or defrauded by actions of Howard F. Hatch considered to be unethical
or inept or otherwise improper for a licensed fiduciary of the State of UtahEach endorser below has (or knows of) their own particular set of grievances,
intentionally not detailed here. This form of general, group expression is
taken to alert the Real Estate Commission to a pattern (often subtle) which may
reach far beyond the parties listed below (including victums unaware of their
disadvantaged circumstances) which perhaps is not ia the public interest and
which warrent investigation by proper authorities.
Address

City

Zip

Comment

Phone

F r w k e l , All Seasons Properties, 412 S 800 W, Orem, Utah
Anthony Ragozzine, 662 W 150 N, Hurricane, Utah

84737

Ruth VI. Ragozzine, 662 W 150 N, Hurricane, Utah

84737

Bryce D. McEuen, Orem City Bldg., 56 No. State, Orem, Utah
florence Liechty, 1465 Apple Ave., Provo, Utah
V
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STATE OF UTAH ) ss.
COUNTY OF UTAH j
Each of the various signatures on these pages were personally subscribed and sworn to by
the said person, at different dates during late 1980, personally before me, a Utah Notary
Public. Nearly all signors complained that the wording of this statement was way too mild
and too weak. They wanted stronger complaint statement against Howard Hatch. But I
stopped obtaining signatures when I realized that there were so many victims of Howard
Hatch who were willing to sign such a statement that I could successfully spend all my
time just obtaining more signatures af^seemingly endless victims. So I stopped seeking
such signatures.
/ 1
J ////
Dec. 20% 1980
^'^""s"-" '."> DwanVjW^k^', NOTARY PUBLIC, bT. OF UTAH
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